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Crossing the Rubicon: The European 
Project in the Era of Globalization
Momchil Jelev
I. Introduction
The European Union (EU) as a historical experiment has already 
survived more than fifty years of development during which economic 
integration triggered political cooperation, the establishment of com-
mon institutions, and a genuine fledgling transnational European iden-
tity and solidarity. Borders have disappeared and, most remarkably, the 
Iron Curtain has collapsed, opening the path toward a true unification 
of the continent beyond its Eastern frontiers. However, this “adven-
ture,” as Zygmunt Bauman calls it, continues, and the shape and func-
tions of the European Union are in constant flux. This has prompted 
questions about the future of the continent beyond its already estab-
lished economic integration. Is it possible that Europe could become 
a federal state? How likely is it that nation-states will increasingly 
cede political sovereignty to the EU, thus creating an entity much like 
the United States? What exactly is Europe in purely geographical and 
normative terms, and does a European identity exist? What are the 
wider ramifications of the European project in a globalized world? 
These are only some of the contentious issues that occupy the minds 
of politicians both in Brussels and in the capitals of the member states. 
The recent attempt to craft a Constitution for Europe was meant as an 
answer to at least some of the problems surrounding the destiny of the 
Union. Unfortunately, the popular rejection of the document in France 
and the Netherlands in 2005 led the EU to yet another Rubicon in its 
development.
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At the same time, the other central concept forming the background 
of this essay is certainly globalization, a complex and multifaceted 
term that has been conditioned by the diverse forces of history, poli-
tics, economics, culture, and technology. The density of the concept 
has been widely discussed in the literature, but for the purposes of 
this project, I define it as a historical period that fundamentally shapes 
the current moment and is characterized by the compression of time 
and reorganization of space to an unprecedented degree in human 
history. More specifically, globalization includes a number of under-
lying features, among them the expansion of the capitalist economic 
system and liberal democratic politics, as well as unequalled techno-
logical innovation and progress. At the same time, globalization has 
created excesses—big winners and losers—along all the defining fault 
lines of the time: politics, economics, culture, and access to technology. 
The world has been reorganized between the aging Global North of 
industrialized developed countries and the growing multitudes of the 
Global South of poor and politically unstable nations. Overall, global-
ization has revealed tremendous new opportunities, but it has also dis-
enfranchised many, thus intensifying the fundamental contradictions 
of the modern world.
My interest in the phenomenon that stands at the core of this study 
is a result of my European background as well as an extensive inter-
est in history and scholarly work in political science and economics 
at Macalester College. However, aside from my personal engagement 
with European unification, the EU, as a unique regional entity in the 
global world, deserves significant attention.
On the basis of these preliminary remarks, my objective is to ana-
lyze the evolution, future, and potential of the European project with a 
clear recognition of the limitations that the task implies. In the process, 
the essay will also compare the EU governance structures (to the extent 
that they exist) to those that emerged in the United States more than 
200 years ago. Moving beyond the internal structures of the EU, I will 
also dedicate space to analyzing the potential significance of Europe in 
the era of globalization.
This article is the culminating product of research, interviews, and 
discussions carried out throughout the two semesters of Macalester 
College’s Globalization in Comparative Perspective program. The 
structure of the essay reflects the division between research done in the 
first semester in the United States and in the spring of 2007 in Maas-
tricht in the Netherlands. However, a variety of topics and discussions 
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were initiated in the fall and completed or examined in further depth 
in the spring. As a result, a rigid temporal division of the analysis was 
neither feasible nor desirable.
In the fall semester, research was mainly a result of library inqui-
ries at Macalester College in Saint Paul, Minnesota. In contrast, the 
scholarly work performed in the spring stemmed from a variety of 
sources at Maastricht, such as the European Institute of Public Admin-
istration (EIPA) and the University of Maastricht, as well as an educa-
tional excursion to Brussels. Maastricht also offered the opportunity 
of arranging a number of interviews that enhanced the content and 
depth of the study. Moreover, the core seminar of the program in Janu-
ary offered lectures and discussions that enriched my knowledge and 
understanding of the European Union, introduced me to one of the 
expert interviewees for this project, and in many ways served as a 
bridge between the fall and spring components of the research.
II. Operational Strategy
The essay is divided into four parts. As a product of the first semester 
of research and an indispensable foundation for the rest of the paper, 
a historical overview of European integration up until 2003 will be 
offered in Section III, followed by a discussion of the Constitutional 
Treaty. Here, I have attempted to focus on the major steps in an other-
wise complex narrative, and as a result, some details along the histori-
cal timeline have inevitably been left out.
Section IV, which emerged as a bridge between the fall and spring 
components of the research, will focus on more theoretical points on 
the nature of the EU as well as comparing and contrasting the integra-
tion of Europe with the forging of the United States of America. Natu-
rally, a complete view of all the literature on the issue would be too 
daunting a task; thus, without any claim to comprehensiveness, I have 
selected some seminal theoretical concepts and ideas about the EU and 
its relationship to the American federal model.
In order to complement the theoretical and research-based aspects 
of the essay, the views of four intellectuals on the future of Europe 
are summarized in Section V.1 In this section, the goal is to provide 
a balanced approach, offering the opinions of a Brussels-based EU 
researcher and lecturer, a former EU Commissioner from the Neth-
erlands and founding member of the Union, an established diplomat 
and lecturer from Bulgaria (the most recent member state of the EU), 
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and an American expert on economic affairs. Gathered throughout 
spring 2007, the varied perspectives of the four are an uncontestable 
asset to the depth and breadth of this study, illustrating the distinct 
added value of my experiences in Maastricht. Nevertheless, as the 
nature of interviewing implies, these are all personal opinions that do 
not reflect the official positions of the EU or the respective member 
states. Moreover, the selection of the individuals was also a function of 
the limitations of travel and resources during the second semester of 
the program.
Finally, as a culmination to the essay, Section VI deals with the 
future ramifications of EU political integration, turning to the broader 
context in which the European project exists and bringing together 
the concepts, discussions, and research from both semesters of the 
program. Here, questions about the role of Europe as a new political 
model transcending the paradigm of the nation-state are examined 
within the framework of globalization.
III. A Historical Canvass: The European Project from 1945 to 2005
Ideas of a united Europe date back to the time of Charlemagne circa 
the 9th century, and several after him have attempted to bring the 
peoples of the continent together, among them Napoleon and Hitler. 
When the war-torn Europe of the post-1945 years was recovering from 
hatred, destruction, and poverty, few would believe that European 
states could ever work together in a constructive way toward sustain-
able peace. However, a qualitative difference in the post-World War 
II era was that no one desired unification through warfare anymore, 
and a genuine belief emerged that the same goal could be pursued 
through cooperation, common interests, and security. The creation of 
common interest between former adversaries would allow them to 
share each other’s resources and not fight for them, decreasing the pos-
sibility of war by eliminating its underlying roots. What is more, there 
was a strong sentiment among the intellectuals of the time in favor of 
a European Union much like the American state on the other side of 
the ocean. In a famous speech in Zürich in 1946, Churchill stressed the 
importance of re-creating the European family in a structure like that 
of the “great Republic across the Atlantic Ocean.” “We must build a 
kind of United States of Europe” was Churchill’s conclusion, and this 
gave the impetus behind the idea of a federal union among former 
enemies.2
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As one of the founding fathers of the European Union, Jean Monnet 
had a particular vision about the long-term evolution of the project. 
He believed that unification should happen gradually, and its tangible 
benefits would naturally lead to the formation of a federation. He did 
not want to set a specific timeline for the process but rather argued that 
it would happen in “piecemeal, incremental steps.”3 Robert Schuman, 
the French Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, then set 
the beginning of the project in his declaration on May 9, 1950, which 
forged the European Coal and Steel Community.4 However, it was 
clear to him that the finalité politique of European integration would 
render an entity much different from a loose union based on the pool-
ing of natural resources. A European federation would be built over 
time through “a series of concrete achievements, each of which will 
create a de facto solidarity.”5 Similarly, Monnet believed that at some 
point in the future “a qualitative change would occur in the political 
relation between states and people,” but only when the “force of neces-
sity” makes it “seem natural in the eyes of Europeans.”6
Granted, Monnet had his critics, who were skeptical (to say the 
least) of the possibility for quantitative benefits leading to qualitative 
changes in the European mentality vis-à-vis a common state. Among 
them, Altiero Spinelli was the most vocal. He claimed that Monnet 
failed to address issues of the organization of European power and 
that independent European institutions would not be capable of super-
seding the nation-state. In short, he considered too ambitious Monnet’s 
assumption that functional achievements would necessarily lead to 
the building of political Europe. Without fundamentally transforming 
power distribution between member states and European institutions, 
Spinelli argued, the core of a federal Europe would always be too weak 
relative to the individual governments. In this context, Spinelli claimed 
that Europe would hardly move beyond a Common Market. Indeed, 
this sparked the most fundamental and lasting debate surrounding the 
European Union. Its two polarized articulations are still with us today, 
shaping the discussion on the future of Europe: some believe the EU 
should focus on intergovernmental cooperation, leaving sovereignty 
to member states, while others argue that the Union should evolve into 
a supranational entity in which decision making is centralized.7 The 
following sections will address more closely these diverging views on 
what precisely Europe could represent.
Against the backdrop of long-term visions like these, the actual 
unification gradually began to take shape. In 1957, the Rome Treaty 
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was signed between six countries, forming the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and clearly expressing the objective of working 
toward an “ever closer union.”8 The treaty established the norms and 
principles of European integration, as well as the incipient structures 
of a political Union. Naturally, the economic path was seen as an easier 
starting point for the project, and the belief of many was that as eco-
nomic cooperation intensified, the need would gradually emerge to 
create tighter political cooperation, ultimately culminating in the for-
mation of a federal union.
In this context, European integration continued, often hitting obsta-
cles but always eventually overcoming the roadblocks on the way. The 
steady integration of the Common Market (in goods, services, labor, 
and capital) made the EEC attractive to new member states and, in 
the 1970s and 1980s, six new members joined.9 In 1985, following the 
Schengen Treaty, physical borders and border control between most 
EU member states were also removed and people could move freely 
throughout the Union without going through immigration and cus-
toms control. Finally, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 fundamentally 
changed the global political order with the collapse of communism. 
This opened up Eastern Europe, offering the continent a unique chance 
to become truly united for the first time in history. The importance of 
the opportunity was expressed by Pope John Paul II: “Europe has two 
lungs. It will never breathe naturally until it uses both of them.”10
Meanwhile, Western Europe had reached a degree of economic inte-
gration that called for a common monetary union and ultimately the 
adoption of a common currency. Following the 1989 Delors Report11 
and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, a true European Union emerged (both 
as a term and in substance), which had reached almost complete eco-
nomic integration. The “deepening” continued with the official intro-
duction of the Euro as a common medium of exchange in 1999 and the 
substitution in 2002 of all previous currencies in twelve EU member 
states.12 At the same time, another expansion had taken place in 1995,13 
and the candidate members from Eastern Europe were already knock-
ing on the doors of the Union.14
While the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s were character-
ized by a variety of changes in the EU, questions arose about longer-
term issues. Many wondered to what extent the Union could continue 
to expand, i.e., what was its absorption capacity? If it would pursue 
expansion, what reforms in the structures and functions of the Union 
were necessary to enhance decision making, cohesion, and solidarity? 
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Underpinning these problems was the fact that while economic inte-
gration had evolved and intensified during the previous fifty years, 
political cooperation had lagged behind, and nation-states were reluc-
tant to act together in big policy areas like security, justice, and external 
relations. The asymmetry between these two aspects of unification 
called for a clearer articulation of European common principles, insti-
tutions, and decision-making mechanisms. As a result, following the 
Laeken convention in 2001, a mandate was given by the European 
Council to establish a Convention on the Future of Europe.15 Two years 
later, the members of the Convention proposed a finished product, a 
Constitution for Europe.
A. The Constitution and its Fate
In terms of rhetoric, the chairman of the Convention on the Future of 
Europe, Giscard d’Estaing, considered the panel a historic moment 
in the development of the European Union. On numerous occasions, 
the former French president compared it to that held in Philadelphia 
more than two-hundred years before. According to Walker, there was 
a clear sense among the EU officials and even more among the del-
egates of the Convention, that Europe had reached its “constitutional 
moment” and was firmly on the path towards the finalité politique first 
envisioned by Monnet and Schuman.16 In fact, there was even a pro-
posal to call the European Union the “United States of Europe,” but 
this was eventually rejected. Other debates centered on the inclusion 
of a religious element (Christianity) and the specification of Europe’s 
geographic borders for the purpose of setting limits to enlargement. 
Neither of those was adopted, and while mentioning Christianity was 
stricken from the text, the exact boundaries of the continent and the 
requirements for becoming an EU member remained as vague as pos-
sible. While calling the document a constitution was a clear evolution 
from the EU treaty tradition, nations still remained the “masters of the 
treaty” since signatures and ratifications were required by all members 
before it was officially adopted.17
Setting aside form, the constitution offered few substantial inno-
vations. In fact, as some argue, it is more than ninety percent an 
amalgamation of existing EU law and regulations, and only a very 
small portion contains genuine innovations.18 First, more power was 
accorded the European Council, giving it an elected President. Sec-
ond, the Commission would become two tiered. Third, there would 
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be an official Minister of Foreign Affairs, a symbol of a new level of 
coordination of foreign policy among member states. Fourth, through 
strengthening the EU Parliament, more co-decisions were introduced 
and some of the issues related to the EU’s “democratic deficit” were 
addressed. Fifth, qualified majority voting (QMV) would become more 
common in the Council, enhancing efficiency at the expense of allow-
ing states to veto all aspects of policy making on the EU level. Sixth, a 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, much like the U.S. Bill of Rights, was 
included, and the European Court received direct jurisprudence in its 
observance. All these areas, however limited in number and scope, 
clearly indicated that the Union would change in terms of both struc-
ture and function.
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Treaty failed. Even though it was 
signed by the EU Heads of State in 2004, national referenda in France 
and the Netherlands rejected it, rendering the text irrelevant and put-
ting further political integration to a temporary halt. It is worth looking 
at some of the proposed reasons for this failure, while keeping in mind 
their complex interconnection. First, as Walker explains, the EU failed 
to create the necessary awareness about the work of the Convention 
and the final text of the treaty prior to the national referenda. Second, 
the objective of simplification was eventually set aside, and the final 
document was a virtually unreadable text of considerable volume.19 
Third, as Fossum argues, there was no genuine movement in support 
of the Convention among civil society in Europe.20 The decision to 
work towards an EU constitution was seen as a top-down imposition 
from Brussels, the result of high-profile deliberations and virtually no 
communication with European citizens. Fourth, both in France and the 
Netherlands, the referendum was used as an opportunity for people to 
express discontent with the policies of their respective governments. 
Voting against the document was seen as a powerful message. Fifth, 
Europeans had just received their common currency and were psy-
chologically unprepared for another fundamental change in accepting 
a common constitution.21 This idea is supported by those who believe 
that the pace of changes at the EU has alienated the citizenry, a notion 
that has become increasingly worrisome in Brussels.22 Other explana-
tions include the familiar fear of creating a European superstate and 
giving up more national sovereignty to the EU. Evidently, this problem 
could have been rectified through a clear communication and aware-
ness policy from Brussels to all 450 million Europeans. Finally, one of 
the underlying reasons for the failure of the constitution is the absence 
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of a true European identity and the inability of the majority of Euro-
peans to think beyond the notions of the national. This, along with 
other theoretical underpinnings of the European project (including 
the formation of a single European demos) and the linkages between 
the European and American federal models will be the subject of the 
following section. In addition, the penultimate section of the essay will 
discuss in further detail more views within the EU on the reasons why 
the constitution failed.
IV. Several Views of the Elephant: 
The Nature of the EU and its American Nuances
As the history of the EU shows, the Union is a highly complex and 
contradictory project that often inspires diametrically opposite views 
about its functions, structures, effectiveness, and future. At the out-
set, it is important to distinguish between the terms often used to 
characterize the EU. Hueglin23 and Burgess24 explain that federalism 
means a centralization of power into a single superstate structure that 
in the majority of occasions overrules the decisions of member states. 
The United States could be labeled a federation, and so could Canada 
or Germany, although the degree of centralization varies in different 
cases. At the same time, a confederation implies that power remains 
in the hands of member states (hence, an intergovernmental system), 
and this appears as a more appropriate label for the EU at its current 
level of political integration. Bulmer agrees with this characterization 
and calls the EU a “form of governance without government,” with 
relatively weak Union-wide representative bodies.25 Thus, for him, the 
central question is whether states are returning to the familiar power 
relations of the Westphalian system, using the EU to increase their own 
autonomy and sovereignty. This is a plausible argument, since most 
decisions at the EU level are adopted by consensus, which effectively 
gives veto power to every single member.26
Beyond the difference between federation and confederation, Hueg-
lin goes further and distinguishes between two types of federalism, 
constitutional and treaty federalism, in an attempt to characterize more 
precisely the European Union. He ascribes constitutional federalism to 
the American system in which the U.S. Constitution clearly establishes 
the primacy of federal legislation. Despite efforts to coordinate laws on 
the local and national levels, the Union-level always prevails. Accord-
ing to the so-called “Hamiltonian project,”27 both people and states 
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are represented in the federal government and in this way individual 
rights are protected. The House represents different political groups 
within society, while the Senate reflects the fifty states in the Union. 
Finally, constitutional federalism also eliminates any possibility for ter-
ritorial sovereignty and imposes considerable limitations on the pow-
ers of states.
In contrast, Hueglin describes treaty federalism as a more flexible 
system of governance, with the EU notion of subsidiarity as its central 
pillar. All members within the Union are equal and decisions are made 
on the lowest possible level. As a result, the added value of EU legisla-
tion should be clearly demonstrated and defended before decisions are 
made on this highest level. In addition, even when the EU sets rules for 
the entire Union, implementation is left to the different member states. 
Within this structure, only the European Council can change the Union 
treaties themselves, while the Council of Ministers effectively acts as a 
legislative body.28
Hueglin also acknowledges that treaty federalism in the context of 
the EU is a constantly evolving system, and the power of nation-states 
is gradually reduced in some areas of decision making. Thus, even 
though countries remain the central agents within the EU, there is a 
pronounced movement beyond simply confederate governance. In this 
respect, Hueglin argues that the EU is a unique political entity,29 which 
could constitute the leading model of governance in the era of global-
ization. This issue will be explored further in following sections.
A particular set of contradictions that could define the future of the 
EU are enunciated by Giegrich in Continuous Controversies in the Debate 
on the European Constitution.30 First, he argues that the EU needs to make 
it clear whether it is barely an association of states or a union of nations. 
Both terms are mentioned in the Treaty of the European Union,31 the 
former reflecting the current status quo and the latter representing a 
future goal. Second, there is a certain vagueness as to whether the 
Union focuses on dynamism or consolidation in its integration. In this 
context, an ultimate destination for integration was never articulated (a 
move away from consolidation), and the constitution does not address 
this issue. Therefore, it seems that dynamism is retained as the path 
towards consolidation and “a common destiny.”32 Finally, Giegrich 
focuses on the dynamics between national and European constitution-
alism and their potential to evolve together, rather than continue to be 
in constant tension. In this domain, Giegrich argues, the constitution 
would have also introduced important changes, strengthening the Par-
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liament, introducing more QMV, and increasing the transparency in 
the work of the EU.
Another interpretation of the political integration issues facing the 
EU is presented by Fossum.33 He identifies two possible lenses through 
which one could look at the EU today. On one hand, Fossum talks 
about deep diversity as an articulation of complete constitutional tol-
erance, i.e., the recognition of multiple demoi within the Union.34 This 
contrasts with the ideas of Habermas, for example, who claims that the 
EU needs common principles and values that bind the European demos 
as a basis for increased solidarity, integration, and cooperation. In fact, 
Fossum claims that “plurality of ways of belonging” are accepted and 
even encouraged in the EU.35 This seems to describe the EU well: it is 
still a conglomeration of different nations and peoples, and the govern-
ing authority is derived from the will of all members. At the same time, 
Fossum describes another vision that could shape the future of Europe. 
Constitutional patriotism, as a clear path toward a single democratic 
state and an expression of a common allegiance to transnational values 
and principles, is a future objective rather than current reality within 
the EU. One of its prerequisites is a popular endorsement of a constitu-
tion and a system in which member states cannot veto decisions. Over-
all, Fossum, much like Hueglin and Giegrich, describes a framework 
that tightly reflects the status quo of the EU, but he also suggests that 
the Union is in constant evolution and strives to achieve a longer-term 
vision of political integration and power dynamics.
In conclusion, it is important to return to the divergences between 
the American and European political models. While in the U.S. fed-
eration was imposed through a single constitutional document, the 
EU has adopted an incremental system of integration that would grad-
ually lead to tighter political cooperation. Moreover, while the U.S. 
began unification through political consolidation, Europe undertook 
the path of economic integration and concrete functional achievements 
(common market, single currency, etc.) on the way towards a finalité 
politique.
With regard to the European constitution and its American counter-
part, three differences are significant. First, while the U.S. constitution 
claims to establish a contract between a state and its people, the EU 
analogue is primarily a contract between states for shared responsibili-
ties between them and the Union. Second, the U.S. model is a consti-
tutional federation, while the EU focuses on treaty federalism. Third, 
as Fossum argues, the EU is still within the realm of “deep diversity” 
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while the U.S. has reached closer integration through “constitutional 
patriotism.”36 Thus, among others, Burgess concludes that, “the EU is 
not a federation in the conventional sense” but rather “a new kind of 
federal-confederal union that we can classify either as a ‘new confed-
eration’ or a new federal model.”37
V. Beyond the Theory: Two Images on the Future of the EU
Aside from the written literature, this essay relies on interviews with 
intellectuals on both sides of the Atlantic and within different regions 
in the EU. Firstly, within the European Union, it is valuable to examine 
the opinions of a Brussels researcher, a Dutch politician and former 
European Commissioner, and a Bulgarian diplomat and scholar. These 
interviews have the goal of illustrating the internal dynamics of the EU 
vis-à-vis the future of the Union, highlighting possible disparities in the 
views of old and new member states. Secondly, I will return to a larger-
scale analysis with an outsider’s perspective on the global implications 
of the European political project; this will also serve as a bridge to the 
last section of the paper.
A. “Old” and “New” Europe: Common Interests or Division of 
Priorities?
In an interview in June 2007 as a follow-up to our discussion during 
the January seminar of the program, Ruben Lombaert, a researcher at 
the Institute for European Studies in Brussels, addressed some of the 
core issues related to the future of Europe. Mr. Lombaert attributes the 
failure of the European constitution to a number of factors. Firstly, he 
emphasizes the poor communication on the part of the EU, which only 
improved once there was a real threat of negative votes during the 
ratification referenda. Moreover, the choice of the word “constitution” 
was, in his opinion, a mistake which did not take into account the par-
ticular emotional and historical significance it carries for Europeans. 
Overall, Lombaert claims that the entire project was neither carefully 
prepared, nor explained, nor “sold,” to the general population. What 
is more, the continued behavior of EU leaders along the lines of “we’ll 
carry on as if nothing happened” has not been helpful in the period 
after the negative votes.38
Lombaert continues his sobering analysis of the political situation in 
the EU by arguing that there is no possibility in reviving the Constitu-
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tional Treaty. However, in his view, the June 2007 European Summit39 
clearly showed that while most of the symbolic elements of the docu-
ment have to be removed, “the essence is still there.” At the same time, 
though, he does not see sufficient political will among European lead-
ers to move towards considerable tightening of the European political 
integration process: “I have the feeling many people [in Brussels] are 
‘walking on eggs.’ ” This clearly summarizes many observers’ opinions 
about the sentiments that pervade Brussels on the issue of further 
political unification. A sense of uneasiness and extreme care in rhetoric 
and action alike will hardly lead to bold moves toward an “ever closer 
union.” Yet, as the recent summit showed, Europe often manages to 
continue forward even in the most unlikely of circumstances.
With respect to more general questions about the future of the 
Union, Lombaert offers nuanced, yet well-founded opinions. He 
argues that the European Union shares some common features with 
the U.S. federal model, but the differences outnumber the similarities, 
especially in terms of the powers and representation of member states, 
decision-making procedures, and the structure and functions of the 
various core institutions. As a whole, Lombaert claims that the systems 
are fundamentally different, and while some parallels can be drawn, 
those certainly should not be overstated. Finally, when addressing the 
much-discussed issue of a common European identity, the Brussels 
researcher is careful in pointing out that the formation of identities is 
a dangerous project, and one first needs to establish what a European 
identity would mean, i.e., what binds all Europeans together. In his 
words, “a common identity should be based upon a common recogni-
tion and acceptance of a number of distinct values,” and yet, “talking 
about European identity and ‘creating’ one is in some ways opening 
Pandora’s box.” Thus, in contrast with other interviewees, Lombaert 
proves the most cautious when talking about a common European 
identity as a precursor of a deepened political integration of the conti-
nent.40
Karel Van Miert, former Commissioner on Competition and Trans-
port and an active participant in Dutch public policy, offers another 
perspective on European unification and the failed constitution. He 
argues that Europe is “in a state of confusion and disarray” after the 
negative votes in France and the Netherlands.41 What is even more 
serious is that this makes it impossible to explain where exactly the 
EU is headed in the future. This is, of course, a critical issue, which 
Lombaert also underlines, and it is highly influenced by perceptions 
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of the public about the EU itself. Indeed, Van Miert underscores that 
public opinion has gained significant prominence in the EU. While 
in the past people were hardly consulted on European matters, now 
the pressure for public votes on a number of fundamental EU policies 
and reforms is much greater. In this context, Van Miert agrees with 
Lombaert, admitting that the EU continuously fails to present itself 
positively to its citizens. This was both the reason for the defeat of the 
constitution as well as for the constant attribution of policy failures to 
the EU—and not at the member-state level. Thus, to him, it is crucial 
that whatever Europe’s leaders decide about the future, it is well com-
municated to the public so that the will of the citizens is respected and 
they are sufficiently well informed to make the right choices about the 
fundamental direction of the Union.
More specifically, again in agreement with Lombaert, Van Miert 
doubts that the constitution can be revisited: “I don’t think it can be 
rescued as it is.” He sees the way forward in altering it and preserv-
ing as many of its positive contributions as possible. In the short run, 
though, he is certain that political unification in the EU would be very 
difficult to achieve; in his own words, “it is not in the cards for some 
time to come.” According to Van Miert, rather than emerging as a 
genuine internal process, further integration might be facilitated by 
external events that in one way or another force European states to 
cooperate more and expand the range of common policies, especially 
in the realms of defense and security, as well as external affairs. In the 
end, Van Miert’s guarded optimism is palpable. To him, leadership 
is key, and he argues that all developments in the EU have occurred 
when a group of states get together and act, without obliging the rest 
to join, and letting them follow over time. As a result, rather than 
always seeking consensus decision making, Europe can proceed with 
integration as long as the leadership in the major states has the politi-
cal will to push the process forward and gradually entice the rest of the 
unwilling members.
The future of Europe as seen from Bulgaria appears equally uncer-
tain. Vladimir Gradev, former Ambassador to the Holy See and the 
Sovereign Military Order of Malta, and Professor in Philosophy and 
History or Culture at Sofia University, agrees on some points with 
Lombaert and Van Miert but claims that the failure of the constitution 
was much more a result of negative votes against the Dutch and French 
governments than a reflection of negativism vis-à-vis Europe. Gradev 
also goes further in accusing European leaders that, in their effort to 
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satisfy their own constituents, they shied away from “taking the Euro-
pean idea forward and coming up with a pragmatic vision about its 
further realization.”42 When asked about the future of the European 
constitution, Gradev states that despite the incremental steps forward 
at the June 2007 Summit, there is no distinct plan as to the future of 
the Union beyond the short term. His view is that the EU is moving 
further away from the federal model, which was once again shown 
at the Summit when the word “constitution” was scrapped from the 
discussions on a reformed EU treaty. Thus, much like Van Miert and 
Lombaert, Gradev does not see a real possibility for the further politi-
cal integration of the Union.
However, when asked about Bulgaria’s place in the EU integration 
process, Gradev clearly illustrates the divergence between the views 
of old and new member states: “Currently, Bulgaria needs to complete 
its integration into the Common Market, successfully absorb the EU 
cohesion and structural funds, and achieve overall improvement in 
the standard of living. The idea of EU political integration is com-
pletely foreign to politicians in the country and we could not expect 
Bulgaria to be an active driver in this process.” This illustrates a pos-
sible divide between new and old members of the Union and poses a 
question about the extent to which different members are devoted to 
the future of the European Union. The idea of further political integra-
tion certainly appears at the front of the agenda in “old Europe” while 
most new members from the East (perhaps with the notable exception 
of the largest among them, Poland) are more preoccupied with their 
own development and growth on the path to economic convergence 
with the West. This implies a division in priorities that needs to be 
addressed because in an expanded 27-member Union, diverse agendas 
hold the potential to further stall internal political reforms.
Finally, Gradev offers his views on the long-term goals of the EU. 
Unlike the majority of observers and in sharp contrast with Lombaert, 
he claims that a common European identity already exists. He uses 
the examples of the euro as a common currency, as well as the political 
regime all EU members share—liberal democracy—as the underlying 
commonalities that bind together Europe’s citizens and governments. 
Accordingly, this is fertile ground for the formation of a single Euro-
pean state, but what is necessary (as in every project of such magni-
tude) is “sufficient political will and leadership” to bring the Union 
toward a definite finalité politique.
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B. The Washington Perspective: A European Grand Narrative
Aside from views within the EU, it is important to include a view 
from the other side of the Atlantic, an outsider’s perspective, on the 
challenges and opportunities that lie on the path of the European proj-
ect. As is usually the case when seen from the outside, the Union 
rarely appears as a confused entity in constant search of a meaningful 
identity and direction. On the contrary, both in his book The European 
Dream: How Europe’s Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclipsing the Ameri-
can Dream43 and at the 2007 Schuman Lecture at University of Maas-
tricht, Jeremy Rifkin, a Washington-based economist and EU observer, 
manages to build a grand narrative about the past and future of the 
EU. Rifkin argues that Europe is indeed the growing new power in 
the world, and its unique model of governance, particular values and 
moral standards, and specific understanding of what living a good life 
means will be at the core of a fundamental paradigmatic shift in the 
global social, political, and economic structures.
Similar to the analysis presented by T.R. Reid in The United States 
of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American Supremacy,44 
Rifkin provides a comparative analysis of the U.S. and Europe through 
the lens of history, philosophy, and economics. According to him, the 
dream that spread from the U.S. into the rest of the world in the past 
century implied that freedom was a combination of autonomy and 
mobility, success was based on self-reliance and individualism, prop-
erty and civil rights were sufficient for a good life, and the market was 
the dominant force that governed human relations. In contrast, the 
new dream (much like the old one) that emerges in Europe includes 
freedom as a reflection of a good quality of life and embeddedness 
in a tight social network of relationships and connectivity, a focus on 
human and social rights, a balance between work and play, a combina-
tion of market and state forces in governing the economy, and a view 
of the future beyond economic growth and along the lines of sustain-
able development. Rifkin argues that it is precisely this new view of 
the world that will gradually supersede the American dream, which 
inspired and excited generations of people in the past. Further, he 
claims that in terms of economic strength, the EU should already be 
seen as one entity, and its building units, the member states, should be 
compared not to the U.S. as a whole but to specific U.S. states. This not 
only implies that from the outside Europe is often seen as an emerg-
ing single state (at least as far as the economy is concerned), but it 
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also indicates the scale of transformation that an entire continent has 
undergone in just fifty years. Furthermore, Rifkin claims that Europe’s 
engagement with sustainable usage of resources and its potential to 
create new systems of energy production, supply, and distribution 
could revolutionize world economics, creating a horizontal, more equal 
global economy and thus making the European dream a common goal 
for all people on earth.
Indeed, Rifkin’s view of Europe as a reorganizing force that could 
transform the world in the era of globalization is a provocative one. 
What is more, the author quickly solves the historical debate between 
federalists and confederalists by arguing that Europe will neither 
assume the shape of a superstate, nor will it return to fragmentation. 
Rifkin prefers to see the EU as an unprecedented political project orga-
nized as a horizontal political network where no one dominates and all 
peoples, states, and interest groups have an equal voice. In his opinion, 
an entity like the EU has never existed in the global political tradition, 
and the fundamental ways in which it rearranges notions of power, 
society, and economics is more important than its weaknesses, failures, 
or inconsistencies. Thus, while those within the EU see the future of 
the Union along organizational and structural lines, expressing con-
cern about internal disagreements and functional issues, the view from 
the outside paints a more general picture that places Europe at the 
forefront of political, economic, and social innovation in the 21st cen-
tury. This perspective certainly deserves more attention and analysis in 
the following section.
VI. Europe on the Global Stage: 
A New Model of Citizenship and Governance
At the conclusion of this project, I find myself facing the task of extract-
ing the lessons that studying the European Union can offer about glo-
balization. First, I would argue that since the relevance of the European 
project springs at least partially from the very structure of the Union, 
it is critical to reach a conclusion, albeit a tentative one, as to what 
the European Union looks like structurally and what its importance 
could be in the era of globalization. Despite various attempts to clas-
sify the EU neatly within familiar theoretical and conceptual frame-
works, a notion exists that it might not be possible to describe the 
European project with the currently available scholarly tools. Thus, I 
am particularly disinclined to narrow the European political model 
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and place it within limited categories. Hence, my research has shown 
that Europe is a new political form, somewhere between a confed-
eration (grounded in intergovernmentalism) and a federal, or suprana-
tional, state (sui generis). In this context, the challenge for the EU will 
be to preserve the achievements of the nation-state in a new form that 
transcends national borders. Therefore, I would venture to suggest 
that Europe has the potential to temper the excesses of globalization, 
but this would only come with closer political integration. The Euro-
pean model is indeed a fitting political configuration for a 21st century 
characterized by a plurality of actors from different socioeconomic and 
cultural backgrounds. Thus, this could be “the only model as yet that 
makes the taming of the forces of globalization at least thinkable.”45 To 
those like me— who see globalization as a phenomenon dominated by 
an unfettered market, producing big winners and losers and intensify-
ing the global reach of security threats, natural disasters, and epidem-
ics—this is certainly a welcome point. It also nurtures the hope of those 
who perceive the uniqueness of the European political, economic, and 
social model as an antidote to the liabilities that globalization carries 
in its wake.46 This comprises the first lesson that I derive from the in-
depth analysis of the European project in a globalizing world.
Secondly, working on this research demonstrated an idea that I had 
always been reluctant to accept: the role of the nation-state is funda-
mentally changing. Today it needs to convince rather than to com-
mand. Thus, cooperation through common interest, rather than control 
through sheer power, should be the priority of the state of the future. 
This fits the theoretical arguments of Immanuel Kant better than the 
views of Thomas Hobbes. The former would characterize Europe and 
its inclusiveness through common interest and cooperation as a foun-
dation for perpetual peace. The latter worldview focuses on the force-
ful arrangement of power relations in an uncertain and violent world, 
and largely constitutes the theoretical canvass for the development of 
the U.S. as a cohesive political entity.47 Therefore, I would argue that in 
a globalized, interdependent, and interconnected world, Europe could 
provide the dominant model of governance for the 21st century, much 
like the U.S. symbolized the one of the 20th century.
Third, for the sake of specificity, one could call united Europe a 
“postmodern state” that transcends the familiar Westphalian para-
digm. Indeed, in an increasingly borderless globe where identities 
and citizenship are more flexible and defined by a variety of forces, 
the emergence of transnational societies will become ever more com-
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mon. This process of preserving diversity while eliminating physical 
borders between peoples signals the emergence of a European trans-
national society, an entity that is in the making, albeit perhaps unin-
tentionally. This new political creature has triggered the necessity for 
a fundamental paradigmatic shift from the familiar statist framework 
to a qualitatively new type of structure that would best encompass the 
complexities of new transnational relations between peoples, cultures, 
and countries. It is important to understand, however, that the project 
of a European supranational state (that many advocate, both in the 
academic and political arenas) is not appropriate either, as it would 
operate within the old paradigmatic framework, tracing its roots to 
Westphalia. Hence, the research convinced me to shift my initial pref-
erence for a European superstate to a different kind of political entity, a 
postmodern state, or perhaps even a “network-state.”
Finally, I would like to emphasize the fundamental challenges that 
stand in the way of the European dream becoming a truly global phe-
nomenon. The positive views of the future of the EU would remain 
merely an incomplete normative statement without a sober analysis 
of the current and very immediate limitations of the EU. Indeed, it 
is important to recognize the major liabilities carried by the Euro-
pean Union in the age of globalization because only after successfully 
addressing them can European leaders claim that their model of gover-
nance and social and economic relations could lead the world through 
the 21st century. Realizing the weaknesses of the European project was 
also one of the invaluable lessons extracted from this project, since it 
helped explain the seemingly bizarre sense of pessimism that Euro-
peans overall (mainly politicians but some academics as well) have 
expressed about the EU, particularly after the unsuccessful constitu-
tional referenda. Among the major issues, I would highlight the demo-
cratic deficits of EU institutions, the disconnect between elites and the 
general public, xenophobia and immigration (especially in its Muslim 
dimension), an aging population, economic asymmetry between EU 
member states, climate change and energy, as well as insufficient fund-
ing for globally significant research and development.48 What is clear, 
however, is that the central challenge concerns the identity of Europe-
ans and their readiness to begin thinking in terms of generations and 
beyond the short run, in order to create real solidarity and cohesion 
among themselves. Crafting a common European identity is central 
not only to the European project, but also as a key to the formation of a 
global sense of empathy that transcends national allegiances.
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Whether this new type of global thinking is possible remains unclear, 
and after all, as Rifkin pointed out during his lecture at the University 
of Maastricht, “dreams are not what you are, they reflect what you 
would like to be.”49 In this context, perhaps it will be up to Europe’s 
educated youth to cross the Rubicon and shift many of the political, 
economic, and social fundamentals in order to adapt the entire conti-
nent to truly global life and mentality. The question remains whether 
the European Union can successfully follow the principles and values 
that make up its own tissue. I hope it will, since this would reaffirm 
the last lesson that I take from this project: despite its numerous weak-
nesses, the EU is a symbol of hope because in a world where leaders 
still think in terms of nation-states, the European political project is an 
ambitious and revolutionary undertaking, which could one day rep-
resent the standard for more tolerant and inclusive political structures 
and cross-cultural and transnational relations.
VII. Conclusion
As a final synthesis of the research, interviews, and discussions during 
the Globalization in Comparative Perspective program, two perspec-
tives have emerged through which the European Union’s future can 
be analyzed. On the one hand, one could trace the history of internal 
integration and the technical issues of decision making, the balance 
between the relative powers of member states, or the substance and 
failure of the European constitution. When looking through this lens, 
Europe truly stands at a crossroads. The EU lacks a clear idea as to 
what its structural and functional future should be; there is ambiguity 
as to the geographical or normative identity of the Union; and there is 
a persistent gap between decision-makers in Brussels and a growing 
and ever more influential civil society. Moreover, there is not only a 
considerable divergence of priorities among member states as to the 
political outlook of the EU, but it is also unclear to what extent a coher-
ent vision of Europe’s future exists or could be created. Here schol-
ars offer a number of solutions and yet most of them agree that the 
Union is characterized by fundamental contradictions—between deep 
diversity and constitutional patriotism, or between constitutional and 
treaty federalism. These inconsistencies, which the constitution failed 
to resolve, also make up the major differences between the European 
and American constitutional moments, which (despite exhibiting some 
similar features) remain considerably distanced in time, substance, and 
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outcome. As a result, it would be reasonable to conclude that Europe 
is a political entity that differs from the U.S. and is unlikely, as most 
interviewees across the EU confirm, to move towards a single super-
state in the near future.
On the other hand, it is precisely the uniqueness of the European 
project that becomes the inspiration for a number of analysts who offer 
a larger-scale view into the future of Europe as it relates to the pro-
cess of globalization. Scholars like Habermas, Rifkin, and Bauman all 
allude to the unprecedented model for social, political, and economic 
relations that is the European Union. It is certainly premature to talk 
about the completion of its emergence and transformation, and yet, its 
potential to generate a fundamental paradigmatic shift away from the 
familiar concepts of nation-state, pure market economics, and social 
individualism could become the driving force behind a new form of 
globalization. It remains to be seen whether the EU can offer a new 
social and political model to the world, and, as Rifkin argues, build a 
more equitable economic order in which resources are openly distrib-
uted and shared between people in horizontal networks.
I would argue that answering this question means blending together 
the two perspectives on the European project, looking at the larger-
scale picture with a clear consciousness of the processes taking place 
within the EU. Perhaps the failure of the constitution was a step back-
wards in the movement towards an “ever closer union,” but at the 
same time, as the views from within indicate, the Union is still in the 
process of transformation. Paraphrasing the words of former commis-
sioner Van Miert, one can think of the European project as a train that 
started its trip fifty years ago, has no strictly defined direction, still 
has not stopped at a station, and yet continues incessantly to move 
forward. And this is indeed what matters the most—both to Europeans 
and to the world. •
Notes
1. All four interviewees were asked the same set of questions in an attempt to gauge both 
the fundamental differences as well as the minute nuances in their views on Europe’s 
future.
2. T.R. Reid, The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American 
Supremacy, 2006, pp. 35-36.
3. Burgess 2006, p. 229.
4. Ever since 1950, May 9th has become “Europe Day” and is celebrated annually 
throughout the European Union.
5. Reid 2006, p. 43.
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6. Burgess 2006, p. 231.
7. In the early years of the European Union, this view was espoused particularly by 
Charles de Gaulle, who opposed the idea of European integration at the expense of 
national sovereignty.
8. Originally, the EEC members were France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
and Luxembourg.
9. Denmark, United Kingdom, and Ireland in 1973; Greece in 1981; and Spain and Por-
tugal in 1986.
10. Reid 2006, p. 53.
11. The Delors Report focused on the potential for forming an Economic and Monetary 
Union, thus giving the impetus for including EMU in the Maastricht Treaty and creating 
the three-stage transition to EMU, which constitutes the roadmap for EU members to 
adopt the common currency.
12. According to the requirements for joining the EMU in the three-stage process, by 
1999 only eleven countries had managed to reduce deficits below 3% and keep inflation 
within 2% (along with other benchmarks). These were joined after 2001 by Greece and 
thus only twelve states adopted the common currency, discarding their own national 
currencies and surrendering a great deal of macroeconomic policy to the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB).
13. The economically developed Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EU relatively 
easily, while referenda in Norway and Switzerland rejected membership. The Swiss, 
however, are part of the European Free Trade Area, which de facto makes them members 
of the common market. Moreover, the addition of East Germany to the EU in 1990 is also 
seen as a quasi-enlargement but did not resemble in scale any of the other ones and was 
considered a natural unification of a separated people.
14. The Eastern Enlargement consisted of two phases: in 2004, Slovenia, Slovakia, Esto-
nia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic became members (along 
with Cyprus and Malta), and in 2007 Bulgaria and Romania brought the total number of 
EU members to 27, almost twice the size of ten years ago.
15. The makeup of the Convention was diverse and widely representative. The Heads 
of State or Government of the 15 EU countries and the 13 candidates (including Turkey) 
were all invited, and all of their Parliaments also sent two representatives each. More-
over, the EU Commission, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Commit-
tee, and the Committee of the Regions comprised the core EU institutions that were also 
given a voice. As Burgess (2006) explains, the convention “could hardly be considered 
Europe’s equivalent to the Philadelphia Convention (1787) but it certainly represented 
the key players in the next stage of the European project” (p. 241).
16. Walker 2004.
17. Walker 2007, p. 377.
18. In fact, as Nugent (2006) argues, the Constitutional Treaty offered much less substan-
tial innovations than previous treaties (e.g., the Single European Act or the Maastricht 
Treaty) but its high profile and the use of the word “constitution” made its ratification a 
much more complicated and uncertain affair.
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19. Burgess (2006) characterizes the document as “a huge, unwieldy tome that remains 
for the moment a mystery to the vast majority of EU citizens, who are not yet properly 
engaged with the processes of constitution-building and ratification” (p. 243).
20. Fossum 2004.
21. Also articulated during Ruben Lombaert’s lecture in Brussels at the January core 
seminar.
22. As former EU Commissioner Van Miert explains in the penultimate section of the 
paper, the importance of European public opinion has grown disproportionately in the 
last decade, and it appears inconceivable to continue with the development of the Euro-
pean project without consulting the continent’s citizens on the major decisions along the 
way (Van Miert, May 2007).
23. Hueglin 2000.
24. Burgess 2006.
25. Bulmer 1996, p. 22.
26. Decision-making by consensus has been the preferred system in the EU since its 
establishment. It provides each state, regardless of its economic or demographic impor-
tance, an equal say during voting in the European Council. The enlargement of the 
Union has made this system extremely cumbersome, significantly decreasing the effi-
ciency of the EU. There are strong calls for expanding the recently introduced Qualified 
Majority Voting (QMV), in which each state has a specific voting weight, to as many EU 
competence areas as possible. So far, QMV is only applied to a limited number of policy 
areas, the ambition being to constantly expand it into new domains of decision making.
27. The “Hamiltonian Project” bears the name of Alexander Hamilton, one of the Found-
ing Fathers of the United States and a vehement supporter of the federal idea during the 
1787 Constitutional Convention.
28. Bulmer 1996.
29. In academia and among some politicians, the expression sui generis is often used to 
characterize the EU. In Latin it means “of its own kind” or “unique in its characteristics.” 
In political science, the term is often applied to the European project, placing it some-
where on the continuum between the federal and confederal tradition (Burgess 2006, p. 
240).
30. Giegrich, Continuous Controversies in the Debate on the European Constitution, 2005.
31. Signed in Maastricht in 1992, the TEU remains the major structural and functional 
foundation of the EU (especially after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty).
32. Ibid., p. 7.
33. Fossum 2004.
34. This illustrates the idea that there are diverse communities that live within the Union 
and the formation of a common identity is neither probable nor desirable within the 
framework of constitutional tolerance (which recognizes the equal importance of all 
nations and their unique cultures and identities).
35. Ibid., p. 3.
36. Fossum 2004. This is a point that was also articulated by Ruben Lombaert during 
the seminar visit to Brussels in January 2007. Lombaert used it to show the difference 
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between the harmonization pursued at the U.S. federal level and the preservation of 
diversity that defines the European project.
37. Burgess 2006, p. 239.
38. Lombaert interview, July 2007.
39. The June 2007 EU summit concluded the German Presidency that sought to revive 
the Constitutional Treaty. The goal of European leaders is now to push forward the 
reforms present in the rejected document through a series of smaller treaties that would 
not have to pass a popular vote. After heated debates and considerable disagreements 
among member states, an agreement was reached on a mandate for the articulation of a 
new EU Treaty. Areas of change include the increase of QMV voting by 2014, the creation 
of a High Commissioner on foreign policy, and other reforms that have been, in one way 
or another, part of the Constitutional document. Upon completion of the final version 
of this essay, the EU managed to agree on the Lisbon Treaty, a new reform document 
largely based on the rejected Constitution. The draft treaty was adopted in October and 
formally signed in December 2007 and is expected to pass national ratifications by the 
end of 2008.
40. Bauman (2004) most clearly articulates the identity problem for Europeans: “we, the 
Europeans, are perhaps the sole people who have no identity—fixed identity, or an iden-
tity deemed and believed to be fixed: ‘we do not know who we are,’ and even less do we 
know what we can yet become and what we can yet learn that we are” (p. 12).
41. Van Miert interview, May 2007.
42. Gradev interview, June 2007.
43. Jeremy Rifkin, The European Dream: How Europe’s Vision of the Future is Quietly Eclips-
ing the American Dream.
44. T.R. Reid, The United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American 
Supremacy.
45. Hueglin 2000, pp. 146-147.
46. This relates closely to discussions during the January core seminar on the issues 
of transnational empathy as a tool for addressing the excesses of globalization. In One 
World: The Ethics of Globalization, Peter Singer touches upon issues of trans-border iden-
tity, which is similar to the notion of solidarity that is fostered between EU citizens. 
Singer claims that this paradigmatic shift in seeing the self as part of a global community 
is the key to addressing many of the liabilities carried by globalization. In this context, 
the European Union model fits well with Singer’s ideas and this illustrates its enormous 
potential in the age of globalization.
47. The contrast between a Hobbesian and Kantian worldview is further laid out in 
Bauman’s Europe: An Unfinished Adventure. Bauman explains that the uniqueness of the 
European project is indeed the movement away from a Hobbesian perspective to the one 
of perpetual peace spelled out by Immanuel Kant. The disparity between the anarchic, 
brutal Hobbesian world and an existence in a Kantian constant state of peace—reflected 
in the foreign and domestic policy on each side of the Atlantic—is also the core point of 
divergence between the U.S. and EU worldviews, as Robert Kagan explains.
48. In Rifkin’s book, the chapter “The Immigrant Dilemma” goes into considerable detail 
in discussing immigration as a fundamental challenge to the cultural outlook and values 
of Europe, but also as a potential economic “medicine” that could offset the problems of 
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an aging population and decreasing workforce throughout the continent. The problem 
of immigration has many dimensions that were discussed in-depth and experientially 
examined throughout the January core seminar and the program as a whole, and cer-
tainly the issue deserves attention in the context of the EU. However, a proper handling 
of the subject would go beyond the scope of this paper.
49. Rifkin Lecture, University of Maastricht, May 2007.
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